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Abstract 
Policy discussions on the recent financial crisis feature widespread calls to address the pro-
cyclical effects of regulation. The main concern is that the new risk-sensitive bank capital 
regulation (Basel II) may amplify business cycle fluctuations. This paper compares the 
leading alternative procedures that have been proposed to mitigate this problem. We 
estimate a model of the probabilities of default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 
1987-2008, and use the estimated PDs to compute the corresponding series of Basel II 
capital requirements per unit of loans. These requirements move significantly along the 
business cycle, ranging from 7.6% (in 2006) to 11.9% (in 1993). The comparison of the 
different procedures is based on the criterion of minimizing the root mean square deviations 
of each adjusted series with respect to the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the original series. 
The results show that the best procedures are either to smooth the input of the Basel II 
formula by using through-the-cycle PDs or to smooth the output with a multiplier based on 
GDP growth. Our discussion concludes that the latter is better in terms of simplicity, 
transparency, and consistency with banks’ risk pricing and risk management systems. For 
the portfolio of Spanish commercial and industrial loans and a 45% loss given default 
(LGD), the multiplier would amount to a 6.5% surcharge for each standard deviation in GDP 
growth. The surcharge would be significantly higher with cyclically-varying LGDs. 
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1 Introduction 
The 1988 Basel Accord consolidated capital requirements as the cornerstone of bank regulation. 
It required banks to hold a minimum overall capital equal to 8% of their risk-weighted assets. As 
all consumer and business loans were included in the full weight category, 8% became the 
universal capital charge for household and corporate lending, while for mortgages the capital 
requirement was 4%. 
Following widespread criticism about the risk-insensitiveness of these requirements 
[Jackson (1999)], the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) approved in 2004 
a reform, known as Basel II, whose primary goal was “to arrive at significantly more risk-sensitive 
capital requirements” [BCBS (2006), par. 5]. Basel II introduced a menu of approaches for 
determining capital requirements. The standardised approach uses external ratings to refine the 
risk weights of the 1988 Accord (henceforth, Basel I), but leaves the capital charges for loans to 
unrated companies essentially unchanged. The internal ratings-based (IRB) approach allows 
banks to compute the capital charges for each exposure from their own estimate of the 
probability of default (PD) and, in the advanced IRB approach, the loss given default (LGD) and 
the exposure at default (EAD); see Box 1. 
As a result of this risk-sensitiveness, a widespread concern about Basel II is that it might 
amplify business cycle fluctuations, forcing banks to restrict their lending when the economy 
goes into recession. Even in the old Basel I regime of essentially flat capital requirements, bank 
capital regulation had the potential to be pro-cyclical because bank profits may turn negative 
during recessions, impairing banks’ lending capacity [Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001); 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)].1 Under the IRB approach of Basel II, capital requirements are 
an increasing function of the PD, LGD and EAD parameters estimated for each borrower, and 
these inputs are likely to rise in downturns. For example, using the formula in Box 1 one finds that 
an increase in the PD from 1% to 3% (something in line with US experience2) increases the 
capital requirement for corporate exposures from 6.21% to 9.32%.3 Clearly, a jump of 50% in 
required capital would not be easy to accommodate in the middle of a recession. So concerns 
about Basel II are stronger than those regarding Basel I because the worsening of borrowers’ 
creditworthiness in recessions will significantly increase the requirement of capital for banks and 
might lead to a severe contraction in the supply of credit.4 At the same time, there is the 
complementary concern that the lower capital requirements in expansions may contribute to the 
emergence of credit and asset price bubbles.5 
The recent financial crisis, with its boom and bust lending cycle, has brought to the 
forefront the need to address the potential pro-cyclical effects of risk-sensitive bank capital 
regulation. The idea is to devise procedures that correct the bias towards exacerbating 
the inherent cyclicality of lending, and consequently distorting investment decisions, either by 
restricting access for some agents to bank finance or, in the opposite direction, by fuelling credit 
booms. 
                                                                          
1. In fact, there is a debate in the literature on whether the implementation of the Basel I capital requirements in the US might 
have brought about a credit crunch in the early 1990s; see Bernanke and Lown (1991), Berger and Udell (1994), Hancock 
and Wilcox (1994), Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995), and Peek and Rosengren (1995a and b). 
2. See the discussion in Appendix B in Repullo and Suárez (2009). 
3. Assuming a constant LGD of 45% and a maturity, M, of 1 year. 
4. These concerns would be exacerbated by mark-to-market accounting, which increases the cyclical movements in banks’ 
capital, and consequently has the potential to amplify the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital regulation. 
5. See Panetta and Angelini (2009) for an extensive discussion of the literature on pro-cyclicality in the financial sector.  
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Multiple committees, institutions, central banks and supervisory authorities all over the 
world are working on mechanisms to abate this pro-cyclicality. To name a few, the G-20 at the 
summit held in Washington [G-20 (2008)] requested Finance Ministers to formulate specific 
recommendations, among others, on mitigating pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy. The Basel 
Committee [BCBS (2008)] in its comprehensive strategy to address the lessons of the banking 
crisis also highlights the need to dampen the pro-cyclicality in the financial system. The European 
Union (EU, press release July 2009) created a working group to address pro-cyclicality issues by 
analysing potential policy responses to reduce their impact. Furthermore, the G-20 at the 
Pittsburgh summit [G-20 (2009)] called on Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to 
reach agreement on an international framework of reform in four critical areas, the first one being 
“building high-quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality.” The Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
issued in April 2009 a series of reports covering different areas of interests in response to the 
current crisis, recommending that the Basel Committee should monitor the impact of the Basel II 
framework and make appropriate adjustments to dampen the excessive cyclicality of the 
minimum capital requirements; see FSB (2009). The EU Economic and Financial Committee 
working group on pro-cyclicality (2009) finds that there is a host of potential elements that can 
contribute to reducing the pro-cyclical effects on the financial system, including counter-cyclical 
capital requirements. 
Both Treasury Secretary Geithner (2009) and Chairman Bernanke (2009) advocate that 
capital regulation should be revisited to ensure that it does not induce excessive pro-cyclicality. 
In the same vein, Adair Turner (2009) proposes the need for regulatory approaches to capital 
regulation to avoid unnecessary pro-cyclicality in capital adequacy requirements. 
One can conclude that there is widespread agreement that something must be done. 
The devil is, of course, in the details. How should the pro-cyclicality problem be tackled without 
throwing out the risk-sensitiveness of the new capital regulation regime? This is what this paper 
is about. 
We present, analyse, and discuss the leading alternative procedures that have been 
proposed to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of the Basel II capital requirements. As a first step, 
we show that capital requirements under Basel II move significantly along the business cycle. The 
analysis is based on the results of the estimation of a logistic model of the one-year-ahead 
probabilities of default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 1987-2008. The database 
includes all commercial and industrial loans granted in Spain during this period, and comes from 
the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes 
value one when a firm defaults in the course of a year on its outstanding loans at the end of the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables comprise characteristics of the firm 
(industry, location, age, credit line utilization, and previous delinquencies and loan defaults), 
characteristics of its loans (size, collateral, and maturity), characteristics of the banks from which 
the firm borrows (distribution of exposures among lenders and changes in the main provider of 
finance), and macroeconomic controls (the rate of growth of the GDP, the rate of growth of bank 
credit, and the return of the stock market). 
The empirical model provides an estimate of the point-in-time (PIT) PDs of the loans in 
the entire portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of the Spanish banks over the sample 
period, so using the Basel II formula we can compute the corresponding aggregate capital 
requirements per unit of loans. We find that Basel II capital requirements increase more than 50% 
from peak to trough, which is a very significant change compared with the flat requirements of 
Basel I. 
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We next consider the effect of different procedures to mitigate the cyclicality of these 
requirements over the business cycle. According to Gordy and Howells (2006) there are two 
basic alternatives: one can smooth the input of the Basel II formula, by using some sort 
of through-the-cycle (TTC) adjustment of the PDs, or smooth the output by using some 
adjustment of the Basel II capital requirements computed from the PIT PDs.6 We analyze 
both approaches. Following the work of Saurina and Trucharte (2007) on mortgage portfolios, we 
first construct TTC estimates of the PDs by setting the value of the macroeconomic controls at 
their average level over the sample period, and then compute the corresponding Basel II capital 
requirements. Second, we analyze different adjustments to the PIT capital requirements based 
on aggregate information (the rate of growth of the GDP, the rate of growth of bank credit, and 
the return of the stock market) and individual bank information (the rate of growth of banks’ 
portfolios of commercial and industrial loans). The comparison of the different procedures is 
based on the criterion of minimizing the root mean square deviations of each smoothed series 
with respect to the trend of the original series. This trend is computed by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter, which is the procedure customarily used by macroeconomists to separate 
cycle from trend. Thus, our approach aims at smoothing just the cyclical component of the 
Basel II capital requirements. 
The results show that the best procedures in terms of approaching the HP trend are 
either to smooth the input of the Basel II formula using TTC PDs, or to smooth the output 
with simple multiplier of the PIT capital requirements that depends on the deviation of the rate of 
growth of the GDP with respect to its long-run average. Our discussion of the pros and cons of 
these two procedures concludes that the latter is better in terms of simplicity, transparency, low 
cost of implementation, and consistency with banks’ risk pricing and risk management systems. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a broader 
perspective of the rationale for the approach developed in the paper. Section 3 presents 
the empirical model of probabilities of default (PDs) using data from the Credit Register of Bank 
of Spain on commercial and industrial loans for the period 1987-2008. In Section 4 we use the 
estimated PDs to compute the corresponding Basel II capital requirements and its trend using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and then compare different smoothing procedures using root 
mean square deviations from the HP trend. Section 5 contains our discussion of these results. 
Section 6 extends the analysis to adjustments using individual bank data and to the case where 
the loss given default moves along the business cycle, and also considers the cyclical adjustment 
of expected losses. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the tables with the estimation 
results and the analysis of performance of the empirical model. 
                                                                          
6. See also the discussion in Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2009). 
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2 Dealing with the pro-cyclicality of Basel II 
In approaching the issue of how to deal with the pro-cyclical effects of Basel II it is important to 
stress that this regulation is not derived from a framework in which the costs and benefits of 
bank capital regulation are traded-off. Instead, Basel II is derived from an ad hoc requirement 
that capital must cover credit losses with a confidence level of 99.9%, where the underlying 
probability distribution of loan losses is computed using a particular credit risk model. Thus there 
is no presumption that the resulting requirement is “optimal” from a social welfare perspective. 
Of course, designing optimal capital requirements is not an easy task, because one 
would require a proper economic model of the above-mentioned trade-off. A simple starting 
point could be the conceptual framework put forward by Kashyap and Stein (2004). In this 
framework, bank capital regulation is justified by the externalities associated with bank 
failures (losses to the deposit insurer, break-up of lending relationships, disruption to other 
players in the financial system, etc.). Bank capital regulation may serve to correct this externality, 
but if it is expensive for banks to raise and/or hold capital this will have a cost in terms of a 
reduction in the funding of positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects. Optimal regulation would 
trade-off the reduction in the social costs of bank failures against the underinvestment of 
bank-dependent borrowers. 
Using this framework, Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue that if the shadow value of bank 
capital is low in expansions and high in recessions, optimal capital charges for each type of risk 
should depend on the state of the business cycle. Without such adjustments, capital 
requirements would be too low in expansions, when bank capital is relatively plentiful and has a 
low shadow value, and too high in recessions, when the shadow value of bank capital goes up, 
leading to the amplification of business cycle fluctuations. They conclude that optimality would 
require a family of capital charge curves, with each curve corresponding to a different shadow 
value of bank capital. In this way, the cross-sectional dimension of Basel II (that is, that riskier 
exposures carry a higher capital charge) would be maintained, but without undesirable side-
effects in the time series dimension. 
One important issue that is not addressed in Kashyap and Stein (2004) is whether in the 
presence of risk-sensitive capital regulation banks have an incentive to build sufficient capital 
buffers (capital in excess of regulatory requirements) that could neutralize the effect of the cyclical 
variation in capital requirements. This was the view of many regulators before the onset of the 
current crisis. For example, Greenspan (2002) noted that “the supervisory leg of Basel II is being 
structured to supplement market pressures in urging banks to build capital considerably over 
minimum levels in expansions as a buffer that can be drawn down in adversity and still maintain 
adequate capital.” 
To address this issue, Repullo and Suárez (2009) construct a model that shows that 
banks have an incentive to hold capital buffers, but that the buffers maintained in expansions are 
typically insufficient to prevent a contraction in the supply of credit to bank-dependent borrowers 
at the arrival of a recession. They also show that Basel II leads to a substantial increase in the 
pro-cyclicality induced by bank capital regulation, with credit rationing at the beginning of a 
recession jumping from 1.4% to 10.7% on average in the baseline scenario. Finally they show 
that some simple cyclical adjustments in the 99.9% confidence level used to derive the Basel II 
capital requirements may significantly reduce its pro-cyclical effects. 
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In contrast with the normative approach of Kashyap and Stein (2004), the approach of 
Repullo and Suárez (2009) is positive. They take as given the Basel II regulation, and compute 
the associated costs in terms of credit rationing in different states of the credit cycle. This paper 
follows the latter approach. In particular, we do not attempt to provide a social welfare rationale 
for the various ad hoc adjustments that we compare, although we think that they could be 
related to the arguments in Kashyap and Stein (2004). Our focus is on how counter-cyclical 
regulation should be implemented in practice. 
It could be argued that these adjustments should be left to the discretion of supervisors, 
in the context of the so-called “supervisory review process” (Pillar 2) of Basel II. However, we 
believe that having a rule for counter-cyclical adjustments is better from the perspective of 
ensuring a level-playing field at the international level, and also for correcting possible biases in 
the objective function of supervisors, who would normally put extra weight on the avoidance of 
bank failures at the expense of the funding of positive NPV projects. 
The rules that we consider imply changing the Basel II capital requirement kjt for bank j 
at date t to a cyclically-adjusted capital requirement ˆ jtk . The objective would be to remove the 
cyclical component of kjt using a simple procedure that would be applied to all the banks (as 
opposed to using a different procedure for each bank). The natural benchmark for doing this 
adjustment is the trend of the kjt series, which we compute by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. The comparison of the different procedures is conducted in Section 4 for a single fictional 
bank that aggregates all commercial and industrial loans in Spain, although in Section 6 we test 
the robustness of our results using individual bank data. 
Summing up, this is not a paper about how optimal bank capital regulation should deal 
with business cycle fluctuations. It is a paper that considers fixing in an ad hoc manner an ad hoc 
regulation. Nothing can be done on the latter: risk-based regulation à la Basel II is already in 
place. And we think that the former is very important from a policy perspective, because Basel II 
has the potential to induce severe contractions in the supply of credit in downturns. Not 
surprisingly, discussions on pro-cyclicality are at the centre of the ongoing regulatory review 
process. 
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3 Empirical model of firms’ probabilities of default 
Empirical model 
To compute how Basel II capital requirements would evolve over the business cycle we estimate 
a model of default for the firms that borrowed from Spanish banks over the period 1987-2008. 
The model provides estimates of the probabilities of default (PDs) for each firm and year, which 
are used to compute the corresponding Basel II capital charges. 
This procedure, although in line with other recent approaches,7 is obviously subject to 
the Lucas’ critique. Had Basel II been in place, banks’ decisions over lending, and consequently 
the pool of borrowers, might have been different. However, the dominant role of universal banks 
in the Spanish financial system, the limited role of securitization, as well as the tight model of 
supervision implemented by the Bank of Spain, suggest that composition effects may not be very 
significant. 
Based on direct information on firms’ economic and financial conditions, banks grant 
loans with very different characteristics. Some of these differential features are, directly or 
indirectly, contained in the information included in the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain and 
constitute the basis for our empirical analysis. 
The Credit Register also provides information on the default status of each loan. 
This allows us to construct the dependent variable for the regression (logit) model, yit+1, which is a 
dichotomous (zero-one) variable that takes value 1 if borrower i defaults in year t + 1, and 0 
otherwise.8 A borrower is considered to have defaulted if it is 90 days overdue failing to meet its 
financial obligations on a certain loan or if, with a high probability, it is considered to be unable to 
meet its obligations. If a borrower has several loans, failure to meet payments on any of them 
means that the borrower is in default. The default event is conditional, requiring that a firm 
defaulting in a certain year shall not have defaulted during the previous year. 
The next step is to specify the explanatory variables, all dated in year t, that include 
variables that describe the characteristics of the borrower and its risk profile, as well as 
macroeconomic controls and regional (Spanish province in which the firm is registered) 
and industry (NACE code) dummies. 
COLLATERALit represents the average (weighted by the size of the exposures) 
of the proportion of guarantees in a firm’s borrowing.9 The empirical evidence [Berger and Udell 
(1990); Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006)] shows that banks ask for collateral to those firms 
perceived as riskier. MATURITYit represents the proportion of long-term exposures (more than 
one year) over total exposures. The longer the maturity of a loan, the more thorough will be the 
screening process of the quality of the borrower. Riskier borrowers will probably be granted only 
short-term loans. AGEit tries to approximate the age of each firm, with the idea of capturing that 
firms of recent creation are more prone to disappear than older ones. Thus, higher rates of 
default are expected during the first years of activity. As the relationship is not likely to be linear, 
we have constructed a set of dummy variables each accounting for the number of years (one, 
                                                                          
7. See, for example, Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2009), Kashyap and Stein (2004), and Saurina 
and Trucharte (2007). 
8. This definition is similar to that established in Basel II; see BCBS (2006, par. 452). 
9. Clearly, some of the explanatory variables (such as collateral) may be endogenous, but this is not a problem for our 
empirical model since we are interested in predicting default, not in estimating causal effects. 
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two, three, and four or more) a borrower has been reporting to the Credit Register. FIRM_SIZEit 
stands for the total amount of bank borrowing, and proxies for the size of each firm. The variable 
has been deflated by the consumer price index, and enters the model in logarithmic terms. 
We also include in the model the variable NUMBER_BANKSit, representing the number 
of banks that have granted a loan to firm i in year t. We hypothesize that the more banks a firm is 
related to, the more constrained it may be in terms of liquidity and thus the higher its probability 
of default. We expect a non-linear relationship between this variable and the default event, so it 
enters the equation in logarithmic terms. We have also included a variable that accounts for the 
number of times a firm changes its main lender, MAIN_LENDER_CHANGEit. It indicates the 
frequency with which a firm changes the bank that provides the largest amount of funding. High 
values of this variable imply high rates of rotation and hence possible constraints or even 
difficulties in securing finance, which suggest low creditworthiness. UTILIZATIONit is the ratio 
between the amount of credit drawn by a borrower and the total available amount (credit line). 
For various reasons, firms extensively use credit line facilities where they can withdraw funds at 
any time. Collateral required, if any, remains pledged to the credit line. The rationale for this 
variable is that the more a borrower withdraws, the more liquidity constrained it may be. The 
empirical evidence in Jiménez, López and Saurina (2009a) shows that firms that eventually 
default draw down more intensely their credit lines.10 
HISTORIC_DELINQUENCYit represents the borrowers’ record of overdue loans 
that have been paid before the 90-day threshold (that is, before having defaulted) measured as 
the number of years in which the firm has been delinquent divided by the number of years it has 
been reporting to the Credit Register. The problems behind overdue loans are sometimes 
“technical”, spanning only a few days as a result of mismatches in cash flows, but in other cases 
they are good predictors of future defaults. HISTORIC_DEFAULTit is another risk profile variable 
that captures whether a certain borrower defaulted in the past.11 As in the case of the 
delinquency variable, this variable is defined as the number of years in which the firm has been in 
default divided by the number of years it has been reporting to the Credit Register.12 
The macroeconomic controls are the rate of growth of the gross domestic 
product, GDP_GROWTHt, the rate of growth of the commercial and industrial loans in the Credit 
Register, CREDIT_GROWTHt, and the return of the Spanish stock market index, 
STOCK_MARKET_RETURNt. These variables proxy macroeconomic activity factors that affect 
credit risk, an essential ingredient for our analysis of the cyclical implications of Basel II. 
Data 
The database used in the estimation of the model of PDs is the Credit Register of the Bank 
of Spain (CIR). This Register records monthly information on all credit operations granted by all 
credit institutions operating in Spain for a value of over €6,000. The data distinguishes between 
loans to firms and to households. CIR includes information on the characteristics of each loan, 
including the following: instrument (trade credit, financial credit, leasing, etc.), currency 
denomination, maturity, existence of guarantees or collateral, type of guarantor, coverage of the 
guarantee, amount drawn and undrawn of a credit commitment, and whether the loan is current 
in payment or past due, distinguishing in turn between delinquency and default status. CIR also 
                                                                          
10. In fact, utilization ratios are significantly different for defaulted and non-defaulted firms well in advance of the date 
of default (even 4 or 5 years before). 
11. The dates have to be t – 1 or earlier to be consistent with the definition of default: failing to meet its financial obligations in 
year t + 1 given that it was not in default in year t. 
12. Jiménez, López and Saurina (2009a) show that these two variables are good proxies for firms’ financial condition. When 
they replace them by balance sheet and profit and loss data there is no significant change in the fit of the empirical model. 
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includes information on the characteristics of borrowers: province of residence and, for firms, the 
industry in which they carry out their main economic activity. 
Our analysis focuses on loans to firms. The sample period goes from 1984 to 2008, 
although for estimation purposes and to use explanatory variables such as age or historic 
delinquency and default it spans from 1987 to 2008. It should be noted that this time span 
includes the recession of the early nineties and the subsequent upturn during the late nineties 
and the first years of the current decade. The database contains a vast amount of information 
(about 10 million observations). To facilitate the analysis we have randomly selected a 10% 
sample, which leaves us with about 1 million observations. The main statistics of the sample (and 
in particular those referred to the default condition of borrowers) perfectly match those of the 
entire population. 
Results 
Table A in the Appendix presents the results of the estimation of the model. The results 
show that firms that post collateral when granted a loan have higher probabilities of default (PDs). 
Lenders try to mitigate risks by requiring collateral to those firms that they consider riskier. 
Longer maturities are associated with lower default rates, and this is also the case for the age of 
the borrower. Big firms are safer than smaller ones. Firms that are two or three years old have, 
on average, lower credit quality, and as they grow older their default rate decreases. The more 
lenders a firm has and the higher rotation of its main lender the higher its PD. The higher the 
utilization of credit lines the higher the PD, so liquidity constraints also seem to play a role in 
firms’ default. Regarding risk-profile variables, past overdue and past default events are a signal 
of future defaults. Finally, the macroeconomic controls show that firms’ defaults increase during 
downturns, proxied by low GDP growth, credit growth, and stock market returns. 
Tests of stability have been carried out by estimating the model without some of 
the variables, which does not change the signs and statistical significance of the remaining 
variables, and by omitting some years of the sample period, which leads to very small changes in 
the estimated coefficients. The model classifies correctly approximately 70% of the defaulted and 
non-defaulted firms in the sample (see Table B in the Appendix).13 Finally, we tested the 
predictive power of the model by using a second 10% sample of the population.  The parameters 
estimated with the original sample were used to predict defaults in the validation sample. The 
results show that 68% of defaulted and 71% of non-defaulted firms were correctly classified. 
                                                                          
13. Alternative performance measures confirm the predictive power of the model. In particular, the area under the ROC curve 
is over 76% which results in an Accuracy Ratio (AR) of 52%. These results are in line with those in the related literature; for 
example, Chava and Jarrow (2004) obtain an AR of 53%. 
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4 Cyclical adjustment of Basel II capital requirements 
Point-in-time (PIT) capital requirements 
The results reported in Section 3.3 allow us to compute the point-in-time (PIT) capital 
requirements kit for each borrower and each year using the Basel II formula for corporate 
exposures [BCBS (2006), par. 272] included in Box 1, the estimated probability of default PDit, 
and assuming a loss given default (LGD) of 45% (as in the foundation IRB approach of Basel II),14 
and a 1 year maturity. We then compute the aggregate PIT capital requirements per unit of loans 








where lit  denotes the value of the loans to firm i at the end of year t.  
Figure 1 shows how aggregate PIT capital requirements per unit of loans would 
have evolved in Spain during the sample period had Basel II been in place, together with 
the Spanish GDP growth rate. Both series are highly negatively correlated (the correlation is 
−0.80), which suggests that GDP growth rates may be useful to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of 
Basel II. It is important to note that this result is not due to the fact that GDP growth is one of the 
explanatory variables in our empirical model. We also run cross-section regressions for each year 
of the sample (thus excluding the macroeconomic controls) and computed the PDs and the 
corresponding Basel II capital requirements, obtaining a cyclical profile very similar to that in 
Figure 1 (the correlation between both series was 0.94). 
There is a very significant cyclical variation of the Basel II capital requirements when they 
are calculated with PIT PDs. In 1993, at the worst point in the business cycle, they would have 
been 11.9%, falling to around 8% at the peak of the cycle (8.07% in 2005, 7.63% in 2006, and 
8.06% in 1986, three years of strong economic expansion). The variability of 57% in Basel II 
capital requirements from peak to trough contrasts with the flat 8% requirements of Basel I.15 
It should be noted that the average capital requirement over the sample period 
is 9.37%, higher than the 8% of Basel I,16 but this has little significance because we are only 
looking at the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans that typically bears higher capital 
charges than other important parts of banks’ portfolios such as mortgages. In fact Basel II was 
calibrated so that banks would hold total capital equivalent to at least 8% of their risk-weighted 
assets. 
The Hodrick-Prescott benchmark 
To identify a trend in the PIT capital requirements series we apply a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter 
with a smoothing parameter λ = 100 (annual data).17 Figure 2 shows the HP trend in dashed 
                                                                          
14. Section 5.2 analyses the case where LGDs vary over the business cycle. 
15. It can be argued that this result is only for a specific portfolio (of loans to firms). However, Saurina and Trucharte (2007) 
show that PIT capital requirements also fluctuate significantly for mortgage portfolios in Spain. Loans to firms and mortgages 
represent close to 90% of total loan portfolios of Spanish banks. 
16. The actual capital requirement would have been 8%, since loans to firms had a 100% risk-weight under Basel I. 
17. The choice of the smoothing parameter  depends on the purpose of the exercise. Using the standard value for annual 
data ( = 6.25) produces a trend that follows more closely the series and consequently leaves smaller cyclical variations of 
capital requirements. However, a number of people criticised this feature and suggested to us using a flat benchmark (see 
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lines. As expected, the trend filters out the cyclical movements in the capital requirement series, 
being below the series in bad times and above the series in good times, but maintains the risk-
sensitiveness of the capital requirements along the business cycle (i.e. they increase in 
downturns and decline in upturns). The purpose of computing this trend is to provide a 
benchmark for the comparison of different alternatives proposed in the literature to mitigate the 
cyclicality of the Basel II requirements. 
Adjusting the input of the Basel II formula: TTC capital requirements 
The first procedure that we analyze is to smooth the PD input of the Basel II formula by 
using through-the-cycle (TTC) PDs. To estimate these PDs we follow the idea in Saurina 
and Trucharte (2007) of replacing the current values of the macroeconomic controls by their 
average values over the sample period. We then compute the capital requirements for each 
borrower and each year using the Basel II formula for corporate exposures, the estimated TTC 
PDs, a loss given default (LGD) of 45%, and a maturity of 1 year. Figure 3 shows the TTC capital 
requirements per unit of loans for each year of the sample. 
In comparison with the PIT capital requirements, the cyclical variability of the TTC capital 
requirements series declines significantly. The maximum is reached in 1991, two years before the 
recession, at the level of 10.8%, while the minimum is 8.8% in 2005. The change in capital 
requirements from peak to trough goes down to 25%, which is less than half of the 57% figure 
obtained for the PIT series. Alternatively, the standard deviation of the TTC series is 0.62, while 
for the PIT series was 1.27. Figure 3 also shows that TTC PDs would have produced capital 
levels above those corresponding to PIT PDs during the boom of 2003-2007, with a very 
significant increase in 2005 and 2006. 
Adjusting the output of the Basel II formula 
The second procedure to adjust the Basel II capital requirements that we analyze is to apply to 
the PIT series a business cycle multiplier of the form: 
 
tˆ t tk k  (2) 
where kt is the original PIT capital requirements series, computed using the Basel II formula 
in Box 1, and ˆtk  is the adjusted series. A convenient functional form for the multiplier μt is: 
 
( )( , ) 2 tt t
g
g gg N    
      
 (3) 
 
where gt is the growth rate of some indicator variable of the business cycle, g  its long-run 
average, g  its long-run standard deviation, ( )N   is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, and α is a positive parameter. The multiplier μt in (3) has several key features: it is 
continuous and increasing in the proxy for the business cycle gt, so capital requirements would 
be increased in good times and reduced in bad times, it is equal to 1 when tg g , so there 
would be no adjustment at the average of the business cycle indicator, and it is bounded, so 
capital requirements do not increase without bound or become negative. The normalisation of 
the business cycle indicator allows us to express changes of capital requirements (surcharges) in 
                                                                                                                                                      
Section 6.3). For this reason, we chose to work with  = 100. Nevertheless, the qualitative results are not very sensitive to 
the choice of . 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1028 
terms of standard deviation movements with respect to the average value of the indicator. Any 
functional form with these features could be an alternative, but (3) is a particularly simple one. 
Two issues related to the proposed adjustment have to be addressed. First, what is the 
variable that should be chosen as indicator of the business cycle? Second, how does one 
choose parameter α? With respect to the first issue, we consider the three macroeconomic 
controls used in the empirical model, namely the rate of growth of the GDP, the rate of growth of 
bank credit, and the return of the stock market. With respect to the second, we propose as 
criterion for the choice of α (for each proxy for the business cycle) to minimise the root mean 
square deviations (RMSD) of the adjusted series with respect to the HP trend. In other words, we 
choose the value of α that is best in terms of smoothing the cyclical component of the PIT capital 
requirements series. 
The results obtained are as follows. When the variable selected as indicator of the 
business cycle is the rate of growth of the GDP we get α (GDP) = 0.081; when the variable is the 
rate of growth of bank credit we get α (credit) = 0.075; and when the variable is the return of the 
stock market we get α (stock market) = 0.038. 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the adjustment of the PIT capital requirements for the three 
indicators of the business cycle and the optimally chosen values of parameter α, together 
with the HP trend. It can be readily seen that the stock market indicator does very poorly in terms 
of approaching the HP benchmark, while the other two are much better. 
An alternative procedure to adjust the output of the Basel II formula is to follow the 
proposal of Gordy and Howells (2006) to use an autoregressive filter of the form 
 
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )t t t tk k k k     (4) 
where kt is the original PIT capital series and tˆk  is the adjusted series, and  is a positive 
parameter. As in the case of parameter α, we propose as criterion for the choice of  to minimise 
the RMSD of the adjusted series with respect to the HP trend, which gives  = 0.306. 
Figure 7 shows the autoregressive adjustment of the PIT capital requirements for 
the optimally chosen value of , together with the HP trend. As expected, this adjustment follows 
the original series with a lag. The results in Repullo and Suárez (2009) suggest that this is a 
significant shortcoming, especially in downturns, when capital requirements should be brought 
down in order to reduce the likelihood of a credit crunch. Another disadvantage of the 
autoregressive adjustment, noted by Gordy and Howells (2006), p. 415, is that “it assumes that 
the bank’s lending strategy is stationary. A weak bank would have the incentive to ramp up 
portfolio risk rapidly, because required capital would catch up only slowly.” 
Comparing the different smoothing procedures 
In line with the proposed HP benchmark, we compare the different smoothing procedures by 
computing the root mean square deviations (RMSD) of the adjusted series with respect to the HP 
trend. Table 1 shows the results, together with the estimated values of parameters α and  . It 
also shows a performance indicator given by the percentage reduction in the RMSD of the 
original series with respect to the HP trend that is achieved by each procedure (so the indicator 
would be 100% if the adjusted series coincided with the HP trend). Two procedures are clearly 
dominated according to this criterion, namely adjusting the output of the Basel II formula with a 
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credit growth multiplier and with a stock market returns multiplier. The other three procedures 
are very similar in terms of RMSD. We have argued that there are good reasons to discard the 
autoregressive adjustment, so the final choice is between smoothing the input of the Basel II 
formula with TTC PDs and smoothing the output with a GDP growth multiplier. The discussion of 
the pros and cons of these two procedures is contained in the next section 
It is interesting to note in Figure 5 the early tightening in the last years of the sample of 
the series adjusted with the credit growth multiplier. For this reason, we also tried a multiplier that 
used as inputs both GDP growth and credit growth. The results were only marginally better than 
those obtained with the GDP growth multiplier, with a RMSD of 0.0052 and a performance 
indicator of 39.6%. The disappointing result, together with the additional complexity involved, led 
us to discard this procedure. 
 





Notes: This table compares the performance in terms of root mean square deviations (RMSD) from the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) trend of the following adjustment procedures: Through-the-cycle (TTC) PDs, multipliers based on GDP growth, 
credit growth, and stock market returns, and autoregressive adjustment. It also shows the relative performance of each 
procedure, measured by the reduction in the RMSD of the original series with respect to the HP trend, and the value of 
parameter α for the multipliers based on GDP growth, credit growth and stock market return, and of parameter  for the 
autoregressive adjustment.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Given the functional form (3) of the multiplier μt, the value α (GDP) = 0.081 implies that 
capital requirements should be increased in expansions and reduced in recessions by 
approximately 6.5% (since μt = 2N (0.081) = 1.065) for each standard deviation in GDP growth. 
The relatively low value of α (GDP) also implies that multiplier is almost linear for reasonable 
values of GDP growth. In particular, we have μt = 1.13 for two standard deviations and μt = 1.19 
for three standard deviations in GDP growth. This is a convenient property that allows to easily 
translate changes in the business cycle indicator into capital surcharges. 
It is important to note that during the second half of 1989 and the entire 1990 
there were binding credit growth limits in Spain. Those limits were an extraordinary measure to 
complement conventional monetary policy tools during a period in which inflation was hard to 
control. In order to avoid any potential bias in our results against the credit growth multiplier, we 
have rerun the whole exercise from 1991 onwards. RMSDs show almost no change. GDP 
growth is still better than credit growth, although now the TTC PDs adjustment is slightly better 
than the GDP growth adjustment. 
It should be noted that the methodology presented in this paper may be used to assess 
other proposals to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of Basel II. For instance, it could be argued that 
one should focus on proxies for the business cycle that are more closely related to banks’ 
business activity, such as loan losses or profitability. However, in both cases the results are 
disappointing. The RMSD corresponding to a multiplier based on the ratio of loan loss provisions 
Type of adjustment or  RMSD Performance 
TTC PDs – 0.0055 35.6% 
GDP growth 0.0810 0.0054 37.6% 
Credit growth 0.0745 0.0066 23.5% 
Stock market return 0.0382 0.0081 5.3% 
Autoregressive 0.3062 0.0054 36.9% 
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to total loans is 0.0077,18 while the RMSD corresponding to the multipliers based on ROA (return 
on assets) and ROE (return on equity) are 0.0075 and 0.0070, respectively, which are much 
higher than the figures in Table 1 for the GDP growth multiplier.19 
Recently, macro-variables such as the ratio of credit to GDP have been proposed as a 
possible indicator to deal with the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements [see, for example, Borio 
and Drehmann (2009), and Committee of the Global Financial System (2010)]. The idea behind 
the use of this ratio is that increases in the value of the credit to GDP ratio are associated with 
higher leverage levels in the economy and could also imply lowering lending standards and thus 
higher credit risk. As the risk increases during rapid credit growth episodes (relative to the 
expansion of the economic activity), so should capital requirements. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) 
provide robust empirical evidence for the Spanish banking system of a close relationship 
between credit expansion and risk taking by banks. However, we are not convinced that the ratio 
of credit to GDP is the best variable to carry out the adjustment of the pro-cyclicality of capital 
requirements. First, this ratio is a variable thatnormally shows an increasing trend along time. In 
particular, in bad times the reduction in GDP will continue pressing the ratio upwards providing 
the wrong signal in terms of the required adjustment. Second, the performance of a multiplier 
based on the credit to GDP ratio is even worse than the multiplier based on the stock market 
return, with a RMSD of 0.0085. 
Finally, some people have argued that the adjustment could be done using 
forward-looking credit market variables such as credit default swaps (CDS) indices or corporate 
bond spreads [see, for example, Gordy and Howells (2006)]. However, it is not possible to find 
such variables for the Spanish market during the whole period under analysis. Even in the last 
few years, there is only a small number of Spanish non-financial companies for which CDS are 
traded, and there is not much information about the liquidity of those contracts (to figure out how 
reliable prices could be). A similar remark applies to corporate bond spreads. 
 
                                                                          
18. We are using specific loan loss provisions, that is, provisions that cover individually identified losses. 
19. At any rate, we would be rather sceptical about making regulation contingent on a variable that may be easily 
manipulated by the regulated. See Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999), 
and Pérez, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2008), among many others. 
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5 Discussion 
What is the best procedure? 
Our previous results show that the best procedures for mitigating the pro-cyclicality of the 
Basel II capital requirements are either to adjust the input of the Basel II formula using through-
the-cycle (TTC) PDs or to adjust the output with a multiplier based on GDP growth. 
The use of TTC PDs has been criticized by Gordy and Howells (2006), pp. 414-415, on 
the grounds that “changes in a bank’s capital requirements over time would be only weakly 
correlated with changes in its economic capital, and there would be no means to infer economic 
capital from regulatory capital.” They also point out that “through-the-cycle ratings are less 
sensitive to market conditions than point-in-time ones, (so) they are less useful for active portfolio 
management and as inputs to ratings-based pricing models.” Finally, they add (p. 406) that 
“despite the ubiquity of the term ‘trough-the-cycle’ in descriptions of rating methods, there 
seems to be no consensus on precisely what is meant.” 
As noted in Financial Services Authority (2009), p. 89, adjusting PDs so that they reflect 
“an average experience across the cycle” involves a very significant challenge, since it requires 
“the ability to differentiate changes in default experience that are due entirely to the economic 
cycle from those that are due to a changing level of non-cyclical risk in the portfolio.” As a result, 
they observe that “in general firms have not developed TTC ratings systems whose technical 
challenges are typically greater than those of PIT approaches.” The UK Financial Services 
Authority has been working with the industry to develop a so-called “quasi-TTC” rating approach, 
based on adjusting the PIT PDs by a cyclical scaling factor. However, calibrating such factor 
seems a difficult task. From this perspective, doing the scaling with the output of the Basel II 
formula, along the lines that we have proposed above, seems much easier. 
The difficulty in making precise the notion of TTC ratings implies that this adjustment 
procedure would be implemented very differently across banks in a single jurisdiction, 
and especially across banks in different jurisdictions, so level-playing field issues are likely 
to emerge. These issues would be particularly difficult to resolve because of the lack of 
transparency of the procedure. From this perspective, it also seems better do the adjustment 
with a single (and fully transparent) macro multiplier. 
Finally, it has been argued that using one-year-ahead PDs is not appropriate for loans 
with longer maturities, and that for this reason a TTC procedure would be more appropriate. The 
reply to this objection is three-fold. First, the share of long term loans in non-mortgage portfolios 
is relatively small.20 Second, even for longer-term loans, a correct assessment of their risk should 
be done conditional on the state of the economy, not in an unconditional manner. Doing the 
latter, which is in the spirit of TTC ratings, contradicts the Basel II requirement of using “all 
relevant and material information in assigning ratings” [BCBS (2006), par. 426]. Third, one should 
remember that the Basel II formula incorporates a maturity adjustment factor that is supposed to 
take care of possible downgrades during the life of the loan. 
The distinction between conditional and unconditional assessments of risk deserves a 
further discussion. To make it more precise, consider an economy with two aggregate states, 
expansion (denoted by h) and recession (denoted by l). Let ph and pl denote the representative 
                                                                          
20. For example, the proportion of loans in our sample with an initial maturity over one year is only 28%. 
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PDs in the two states, with ph < pl, and let qij denote the transition probability from state i to state 
j. From the transition probabilities one can derive the unconditional probabilities, qh and ql, of 
being in each state, which gives the unconditional probability of default p  = qhph + qlpl. Now 
suppose that the economy is in an expansion state, and that we want to price a one-year loan. 
Clearly we should use the PIT ph rather than the TTC p . Similarly, for a two-year loan we should 
use ph for the first year, and (if the loan does not default during the first year) qhhph + qhlpl for the 
second year. If qhh is sufficiently high, i.e. if expansions have a long duration, then this PD will be 
close to ph, so using the (conditional on the state) one-year-ahead PD would be approximately 
correct for pricing purposes. And so on for longer maturity loans. The conclusion is that cyclically 
adjusting the PDs produces a distortion in the correct measurement of risk that makes them 
inadequate for risk pricing and risk management purposes. 
This is especially relevant in the light of the requirements on the use of internal ratings 
specified by the BCBS (2006), par. 444: “Internal ratings and default and loss estimates must 
play an essential role in the credit approval, risk management, internal capital allocations, 
and corporate governance functions of banks using the IRB approach.” 
The preceding arguments suggest that adjusting the input of the IRB formula by using 
through-the-cycle (TTC) PDs has many shortcomings. The alternative procedure, to adjust the 
output with a multiplier based on GDP growth, is much better in terms of simplicity, 
transparency, low cost of implementation, consistency with banks’ risk pricing and risk 
management systems, and even consistency with the idea of a single aggregate risk factor that 
underlies the capital requirements of Basel II [see Gordy (2003)]. 
Alternative forms of the multiplier 
The proposed multiplier could be adjusted in several ways. For example, the range of μt in (2) 
goes from 0 (when tg  ) to 2 (when tg  ), but one could easily introduce alternative 
lower and an upper bounds so that 1 1t    . Alternatively, the multiplier could be 
redefined so that g = ming  where ming is the lowest value of GDP growth in the sample. In this 
way, it would be possible to generate a positive buffer of regulatory capital, so minimum capital 
requirements would be cyclically adjusted but would never be below the level specified by the 
Basel II formulas with PIT PDs. 
Application to international banks 
The procedure of adjusting the Basel II capital requirements with a multiplier based on GDP 
growth would be applied in each national jurisdiction, possibly with different multipliers 
for different portfolios, and only for banks that are under the IRB approach of Basel II, on the 
grounds that the standardised approach is only minimally risk-sensitive. The procedure is 
very simple, since it only requires a readily available macroeconomic variable such as the rate of 
growth of the GDP, and very transparent, since it would be possible to ask the banks to report 
the unadjusted capital requirements (and the corresponding risk-weighted assets). It would of 
course imply to have different capital requirements for different jurisdictions, but this is an 
inevitable feature of any procedure designed to correct the effect of the business cycle on risk-
sensitive capital requirements. It should also be noted that with the increasing correlation in 
international business cycles these differences should not be very significant. 
The procedure would involve some complexity in its application to international banks, 
especially those that have significant cross-border lending activities. To limit the possibility of 
regulatory arbitrage, which could lead to a concentration of lending from the jurisdiction with the 
lowest multiplier, some general criterion should be establish. A possible approach would be to 
base the calculation of capital requirements on the geographic location of the credit exposures. 
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The final requirement would be computed by adding all the adjustments in the jurisdictions in 
which the bank has a significant exposure. As commented above, the methodology is very 
simple and transparent and the required data are easily accessible in all countries. 
GDP revisions 
One relevant issue about the cyclical adjustment of capital requirements using a multiplier based 
on GDP growth is the fact that in many countries GDP statistics are usually revised, sometimes 
by significant amounts. The revisions are obviously more important for the quarter-on-quarter 
data, rather than the year-on-year data, so we would favour using the latter. We would also 
favour using the latest data corresponding to the second to last quarter, without making any 
subsequent adjustments in the multiplier. For example, in the US the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) releases three quarterly GDP reports: the advance report that comes out within 
one month after the end of the quarter, the second report (formerly called the preliminary report) 
that comes out within two months after the end of the quarter, and the third report (formerly 
called the final report) that comes out within three months after the end of the quarter. Thus for 
the US we could use the final data for second to last quarter (for example, the end-of-2009 
multiplier could have been set with the third quarter data released on December 22), so the 
problem of revisions would not arise. Even when this is not the case, leaving unchanged the 
multiplier after revisions in GDP data should not generate significant deviations with respect to its 
final “correct” value. For example, for α (GDP) = 0.081 a revision amounting to 0.25 standard 
deviations of GDP growth would have a maximum impact on the multiplier of 1.6% (since 
2N(0.081/4) = 1.016). 
How would banks react to the adjustment? 
The potential pro-cyclical effects of bank capital regulation depend not only on the design of the 
minimum capital requirements but also on the endogenous response of banks to the regulation, 
in terms of the characteristics of their portfolio and the incentives to hold capital above the 
minimum required by regulation. Repullo and Suárez (2009) analyse the effect on capital buffers 
of modifying the cyclical profile of the 99.9% confidence level of Basel II, and hence the 
corresponding capital requirements, so that they are lower in recessions and higher in 
expansions. The results show that this policy changes the cyclical behaviour of the capital buffers 
in a direction that partly offsets its intended effect (reducing them in expansions and increasing 
them in recessions), but the net effect is a significant reduction in the pro-cyclicality of the 
regulation. 
Contingent capital: Is it an alternative? 
Contingent capital has recently emerged in policy discussions as an instrument that could be 
useful to deal with the pro-cyclicality problem.21 Contingent capital is a debt instrument with the 
potential of converting into common equity during periods of financial strain. This property 
effectively helps banks to weather recession periods without having to resort to issuing equity in 
unfavourable conditions. At the same time, it could be a cost-effective way for banks to reduce 
their capital holdings, and hence its costs, in normal times. From a regulatory perspective there 
are two problems with using contingent capital as part of the regulatory framework. First, a 
number of important design issues should be resolved, especially in connection with the trigger 
points for conversion.22 Second, there is the view that the new capital regulation should focus on 
core capital, playing down the role of hybrid securities such as subordinated debt.23 The 
                                                                          
21. See, for example, Kashyap et al. (2008) and Flannery (2009). 
22. As noted recently by Sundaresan and Wang (2010), the proposal for banks to issue contingent capital that is forced to 
convert into common equity when stock prices fall below a certain specified low threshold does not in general lead to a 
unique equilibrium, which opens the door to price manipulation. 
23. See, for example, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009). 
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proposal of strengthening the current definition of capital could be blurred if a new hybrid 
instrument is brought into the picture. However, contingent capital could be useful as an 
instrument outside of the regulatory framework for banks to manage their capital over the 
business cycle. Design issues would be addressed by private contracting, and regulators would 
be able to focus on core capital. Obviously, the availability of such instrument would alter banks’ 
incentives to hold capital buffers, but this would not probably change the amplification effects of 
risk-sensitive capital regulation à la Basel II. This is an interesting topic that should be pursued in 
future work. 
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6 Extensions 
Adjustments using individual bank data 
The results obtained in Section 4 are based on an adjustment calibrated for the entire banking 
system, but they would be applied to individual banks. Therefore it is important to check the 
performance of the different procedures with individual bank data. In addition, this extension 
allows us to assess the performance of adjustments based on disaggregated data such as the 
credit growth of each bank. 
In particular, we have chosen five Spanish banks that have opted for the IRB approach 
of Basel II, and that are currently calculating their minimum capital requirements using the IRB 
formulas. We compute the point-in-time (PIT) capital requirements per unit of exposure for each 
of these five banks and for each year of the sample using the estimated PDs, a loss given default 
(LGD) of 45%, and a 1 year maturity. 
The results show that there is significant heterogeneity across our sample of five banks, 
despite the fact that they all operate at the national level (i.e., there are no regional banks). The 
average value over the sample period of their Basel II capital requirements ranges from 4.5% to 
8.2%, and the range of variation from peak to trough is between two and three times higher than 
the 57% figure obtained for the aggregate data. The significant heterogeneity among these 
banks makes the comparison of the different adjustment procedures much more interesting. 
The analysis is carried out with the PIT capital requirements series data of the five 
selected banks plus a sixth fictitious bank that comprises all the other banks in the system. 
To provide a benchmark for the comparison of the different procedures, we compute for each of 
these six banks the HP trend of each capital requirements series. 
Following the steps in Section 4, we first consider adjusting the PD input of the Basel II 
formula by using through-the-cycle (TTC) PDs estimated by replacing in the regression model the 
current values of the macroeconomic controls by their average values over the sample period. In 
this way we get the TTC capital requirements for each of the six banks. Second, we apply to the 
PIT series of each bank the business cycle multiplier (3), where the value of parameter α (for each 
proxy for the business cycle) is chosen to minimise the sum for the six banks of the root mean 
square deviations (RMSD) of the adjusted series with respect to the HP trends.24 As proxies for 
the business cycle, we use the rate of growth of the GDP, the rate of growth of the credit of each 
bank, and the return of the stock market. Finally, we also compute for each bank the 
autoregressive adjustment (4), where the value of parameter  is chosen to minimise the sum for 
the six banks of the RMSDs of the adjusted series with respect to the HP trends. 
                                                                          
24. Although parameter α could be estimated for each bank, we restrict attention to multipliers that have the same α for all 
banks within a jurisdiction. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1028 
Table 2. Root mean square deviations from Hodrick-Prescott trend for different 
adjustment procedures using individual bank data 
Type of adjustment  or  RMSD Performance 
TTC PDs 0.0048 52.0% 
GDP growth 0.1237 0.0066 33.8% 
Individual credit growth 0.0796 0.0091 9.2% 
Stock market return 0.0239 0.0098 1.8% 
Autoregressive 0.3654 0.0070 29.6% 
 
Notes: This table compares the performance of the adjustment procedures in terms of the sum for six banks (five banks that 
have opted for the IRB approach of Basel II plus a sixth fictitious bank which is the aggregate of all the other banks in the 
system) of the root mean square deviations (RMSD) from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of each bank’s series. It also 
shows the relative performance of each procedure, measured by the reduction in the sum of RMSDs of the original series 
with respect to their HP trends, and the value of parameter α for the multipliers based on GDP growth, individual credit 
growth and stock market return, and of parameter  for the autoregressive adjustment. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
In line with this approach, we compare the different procedures in terms of the sum for 
the six banks of the RMSDs of the adjusted series with respect to their HP trends. Table 2 shows 
the results, together with the estimated values of parameters α and . It also shows a 
performance indicator given by the percentage reduction in the sum of RMSDs of the original 
series with respect to the HP trends that is achieved by each procedure (so the indicator would 
be 100% if all adjusted series coincided with their HP trends). The best procedure is now to 
adjust the input of the Basel II formula with TTC PDs, with the procedure based on a GDP 
growth multiplier coming second, and the autoregressive procedure coming third. The other two 
procedures are clearly dominated, including the one based on individual credit growth. In fact, 
comparing Tables 1 and 2 we conclude that the relative performance of the credit growth 
multiplier worsens when moving from aggregate to disaggregated data. Thus, our results raise 
doubts about the proposal of Goodhart and Persaud (2008) to adjust Basel II capital 
requirements “by a ratio linked to the growth of the value of bank assets, bank by bank.” The 
values of parameters α and  in Table 2 are broadly in line with those in Table 1, although 
interestingly α (GDP) jumps from 0.081 to 0.124. This implies an increase in the corresponding 
multiplier from 6.5% to 9.8% (since 2 (0.124) 1.098)N   for each standard deviation in GDP 
growth. 
The superiority of the TTC PDs procedure may be explained by the fact that it 
approaches more closely the characteristics of the portfolio of each bank, instead of using 
a common adjustment for all banks. However, despite its better statistical performance, 
we believe that the arguments in Section 5 are sufficiently strong to favour using the multiplier 
based on GDP growth. 
To the extent that GDP data could be available at the (domestic) regional level, it would 
be possible to compute regional multipliers, with a treatment of national banks similar to that 
proposed for international banks in Section 4. However, we would not favour this approach 
because the high correlation in regional business cycles does not justify the additional complexity 
that would be introduced in the regulation of bank capital. 
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Cyclically-varying LGDs 
We have assumed so far a constant LGD fixed at the 45% level specified in the foundation IRB 
approach of Basel II. However, banks in the advanced IRB approach must input their estimated 
LGDs, which clearly vary over the business cycle (they are typically higher in recessions when 
asset prices are depressed than in expansions).25 This means that for those banks there is further 
cyclicality of the PIT capital requirements. 
A problem to assess the impact of cyclically-varying LGDs on the procedures to smooth 
the Basel II capital requirements is that we do not have data on the LGDs of the loans in our 
sample. For this reason, in what follows we simply postulate a linear relationship between LGDt 
and PDt with the same slope as in Altman et al. (2005) and with an intercept such that when the 
PD is at its average level over the sample period then the LGD equals the reference value of 
45%,26 that is: 
 
LGD 0.45 2.61(PD PD)t t    (5) 
where PDt is the weighted average PD in year t (with weights equal to the borrowers’ exposures), 
and PD  is the average of PDt over the sample period. Figure 8 represents the values of weighted 
average PDs and cyclically varying LGDs. The fluctuation in LGDs ranges between 40% and 
55%. 
Figure 9 shows PIT capital requirements when LGDs vary over time in this manner and 
PIT capital requirements calculated using a fixed 45% LGD. The cyclicality of capital 
requirements increases significantly. From peak to trough, they range from almost 7% to more 
than 14%, which is twice the variation that we had before. 
With this data we proceed to perform the same analysis as in Section 4, comparing the 
different procedures by computing the root mean square deviations (RMSD) of the adjusted 
series with respect to the HP trend. The results in Table 3 show that the best procedures are 
either to smooth the input of the Basel II formula with TTC PDs (and a constant 45% LGD) or to 
smooth the output with a GDP growth multiplier. The performance of the autoregressive 
adjustment worsens relative to the case with a fixed 45% LGD, while as before the other two 
procedures are clearly dominated. 
                                                                          
25. For example, Altman et al. (2005) show that that there is a positive relationship between PDs and LGDs. In particular, 
they regress average bond recovery rates (1 – LGD) on average bond default rates (PD), obtaining a slope coefficient 
of −2.61. 
26. There is not much justification in the literature for this assumption. Araten, Jacobs and Varshney (2004) estimate LGDs in 
the interval between 39.8% and 50.5%, while Gupton (2000) estimates LGDs between 30.5% and 47.9%. Frye (2000) finds 
similar results for senior secured corporate loans. Data collected during the calibration processes leading to Basel II 
(Quantitative Impact Studies or QIS exercises) do not settle the question because those exercises were carried out under 
benign economic conditions. Thus it is not unreasonable to take the 45% benchmark set by the Basel Committee for the IRB 
foundation approach. 
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Table 3. Root mean square deviations from Hodrick-Prescott trend for different 









Notes: This table compares the performance in terms of root mean square deviations (RMSD) from the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the adjustment procedures when LGDs are a linear function of weighted average PDs 
according to equation (5) in the text. It also shows the relative performance of each procedure, measured by the 
reduction in the RMSD of the original series with respect to the HP trend, and the value of parameter α for the 
multipliers based on GDP growth, credit growth and stock market return, and of parameter  for the autoregressive 
adjustment. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Thus, the introduction of cyclically-varying LGDs does not affect the relative 
performance of the different procedures to adjust the Basel II capital requirements. However the 
value of the multipliers is higher. In particular, the jump in the value of α (GDP) from 0.081 to 
0.133 implies an increase in the corresponding multiplier from 6.5% to 10.6% (since 
2 (0.133) 1.106)N   for each standard deviation in GDP growth. 
Obviously, these results should be taken with care, since they are based on the ad hoc 
linear relationship between LGDs and PDs postulated in (5). On the other hand, there is an 
additional factor that increases the sensitivity of PIT capital requirements to the business cycle, 
namely that exposures at default (EADs) also move in parallel with PDs [see, for example, the 
evidence in Jiménez, López and Saurina (2009b)]. It is not easy to simulate the impact of EADs 
on capital requirements, so we will not pursue this here. But the fact that EADs vary over the 
business cycle makes the proposed cyclical adjustment of capital requirements even more 
compelling. 
A flat benchmark 
It could be argued that our results might depend on the filtering procedure used. Although the 
HP filter is the standard procedure used by macroeconomists to separate cycle from trend, 
to check the robustness of our results we tried an alternative benchmark, namely a constant 
requirement at the average level of the estimated PIT capital requirements over the sample 
period, which is 9.37%. We then perform the same analysis as in Section 4 with a flat benchmark 
replacing the HP trend.27 
For this benchmark the best adjustment is obtained with the autoregressive procedure, 
because starting at the 9.37% level and setting the autoregressive parameter  equal to zero we 
get a zero RMSD. However, risk-sensitivity is completely eliminated by making the capital 
requirement equal to the flat benchmark. This is effectively throwing out the baby with the bath 
water, and adds to the previous drawbacks noted in Section 4.4. As for the other procedures, 
smoothing the input of the Basel II formula with TTC PDs dominates the adjustment based on 
GDP growth (RMSD = 0.0066 and 0.0074, respectively), which in turn is better than the 
adjustments based on credit growth and stock market returns (RMSD = 0.0085 and 0.012, 
respectively). The main conclusion from this exercise is that the performance of the different 
                                                                          
27. One way to rationalize this filter is to think of it as Basel I-type benchmark. 
Type of adjustment  or  RMSD Performance
TTC PDs 0.0086 42.7%
GDP growth 0.1330 0.0084 43.8%
Credit growth 0.1329 0.0108 27.8%
Stock market return 0.0489 0.0146 2.6%
Autoregressive 0.2984 0.0095 37.0%
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procedures does not seem to depend on the selected benchmark, but on their ability to smooth 
cyclical patterns in the original PIT capital requirements series. 
Adjustment of expected losses 
Regulatory capital under Basel II is set aside to cover unexpected losses, while expected losses 
must be covered with loan loss provisions. Assuming an LGD of 45%, our empirical model allows 
us to compute the expected losses for each borrower and each year of the sample. From here 
we may obtain an estimation of the expected losses per unit of loans for each year of the 
sample. Figure 10 shows expected losses and capital requirements per unit of loans over the 
sample period. Both series exhibit a very similar pattern, driven by the cyclical behaviour of PDs. 
It is also worth noting that the average level of expected losses (2%) is significantly lower than the 
average level of capital requirements (9%). This means that in order to mitigate the pro-cyclical 
effects of regulation, acting on the capital requirements front is much more important than acting 
on the expected losses front. 
As a response to the current financial crisis, there is a growing consensus 
among academics and policy makers about the need to build buffers in good times that can be 
drawn down when conditions deteriorate.28 One way to build up these buffers would be to 
implement an explicit cyclical adjustment of loan loss provisions similar to the adjustment 
of capital requirements discussed above. For example, a multiplier of expected losses based on 
GDP growth could be designed to smooth the provisioning requirements over the business 
cycle. Thus, during expansion phases, when expected losses are below their cyclically adjusted 
value, the buffer would be built up, while in recessions, when the opposite obtains, the buffer 
would be drawn down. This Economic Cycle Reserve [Turner Review (2009)], could be 
implemented by either adjusting the P&L figures (as in the case of the Spanish dynamic 
provisioning system29) or by restricting distributable profits. The choice between these two 
alternatives would require an agreement between prudential and accounting regulators. 
                                                                          
28. See, for example, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and the G20 Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System of 
2 April 2009. 
29. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) explain the rationale for anti-cyclical or dynamic provisions. Such provisions were introduced 
in Spain in 2000, and were adjusted in 2005 when the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) came into effect. 
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7 Conclusion 
This paper provides clear evidence that Basel II capital requirements based on point-in-time (PIT) 
probabilities of default (PDs) move significantly along the business cycle. According to our 
results, from peak to trough capital requirements for loans to firms may vary by more than 50%, 
a figure that could reach 100% with cyclically-varying losses given default (LGDs). This variation 
in capital requirements could lead to a significant amplification of business cycle fluctuations. 
Therefore, a very important question that is in the front line of current discussions among policy 
makers is: How should the pro-cyclical effects of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation à la 
Basel II be mitigated? To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that presents a 
framework to address this issue. 
We propose a benchmark for comparing different procedures and apply it to the 
adjustment of the estimated Basel II capital requirements for commercial and industrial loans in 
Spain over the period 1987-2008. The comparison is based on the minimization of the root mean 
square deviations of each adjusted series with respect to the trend of the original series 
computed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
The results show that adjusting the output of the Basel II formula with a credit 
growth multiplier (based on aggregate or individual bank data) or with a stock market return 
multiplier is suboptimal, as it is also the case when the multiplier is based on profits (e.g., ROA, 
ROE) or specific loan loss provisions. The autoregressive adjustment performs better, but we 
argue that its lagged response is an important shortcoming, especially in downturns. 
Consequently, the final choice is between smoothing the input of the Basel II formula by using 
through-the-cycle (TTC) PDs or smoothing the output with a multiplier based on GDP growth. 
Our discussion of the pros and cons of these two procedures concludes that the latter is better 
in terms of simplicity, transparency, low cost of implementation, and consistency with banks’ risk 
pricing and risk management systems. 
We also show that for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans in Spain and for 
banks using the foundation IRB approach (with an LGD set at 45%), the multiplier would amount 
to a 6.5% surcharge for each standard deviation in GDP growth. The surcharge would be 
significantly higher for banks using cyclically-varying LGDs. Applying these results to the current 
crisis, where GDP growth in many countries is 3 or more standard deviations below its long-run 
average, would imply a reduction in capital requirements of the order of at least 20%. The 
analytical framework presented in the paper could also be applied to expected losses, so it can 
be used to calibrate economic cycle reserves or dynamic provisions. 
To conclude, it is important to stress that the proposed adjustment maintains the risk-
sensitivity of the Basel II capital requirements in the cross-section, so banks with riskier portfolios 
would bear a higher capital charge, but a cyclically-varying scaling factor would be introduced to 
increase capital requirements in good times and to reduce them in bad times. Such changes 
should contribute to reduce the incidence and magnitude of both credit bubbles and credit 
crunches. 
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Box 1. Key features of the Basel II framework 
In June 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the revised capital 
adequacy framework, commonly referred to as Basel II, with the aim of a better alignment 
of capital requirements to banking risks.30 In other words, the idea was to improve on the 
relatively risk-insensitive framework of Basel I, by requiring higher capital charges to riskier 
borrowers. 
Basel II adopts a three-pillar structure: Pillar 1 requires banks to maintain a minimum 
amount of capital for credit, market, and operational risks. It sets out the quantitative and 
qualitative requirements and algebraic formulae to calculate capital for the different types of asset 
classes identified. Pillar 2, devoted to the supervisory review process, is intended to ensure that 
banks possess adequate capital for the full range of risks they run. In doing this, banks should 
develop their own risk management techniques to contribute to the overall assessment of their 
capital levels under the monitoring of the supervisory authorities. Pillar 3 aims to bolster market 
discipline to complement the other two pillars by setting out disclosure requirements applicable 
to banks in areas such as required capital, risk exposures, and risk assessment procedures. 
Focusing on Pillar 1, and in particular on credit risk, Basel II provides a menu of 
approaches to calculate the minimum capital requirement according to the sophistication 
of a bank’s activities and its internal risk management capabilities. The three approaches are: 
• The standardised approach. 
The foundation internal ratings-based approach. 
The advanced internal ratings-based approach. 
The standardised approach is based on external credit assessments, when they are 
available, and if they are not exposures require the same capital charge as in Basel I (8%). The 
main principle behind the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches is that banks assign exposures 
to different asset classes and, within them, banks assign different internal rating grades 
according to the their credit quality (creditworthiness).31 In particular, banks estimate, for each 
borrower or homogenous groups of them, a series of credit risk drivers that determine the 
corresponding capital charges. These drivers are: 
• The one-year ahead probability of default (PD). 
• The loss given default (LGD). 
• The exposure at default (EAD).32 
• The maturity (M) of the exposure. 
                                                                          
30. In June 2006 the Basel Committee released a final comprehensive version that included the 2004 Capital Accord, the 
elements of the 1988 Capital Accord that were not revised during the Basel II process, and the 1996 Amendment 
incorporating market risks. 
31. Broadly speaking asset classes are divided into two main categories: corporate and retail exposures. Retail 
exposures are in turn divided into residential mortgages exposures, qualifying revolving exposures, and other 
retail exposures. Securitisations are treated separately. 
32. For on-balance sheet items this parameter will be the amount of the exposure. For off-balance sheet items, credit 
conversion factors are used to obtain credit equivalent amounts. 
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In the advanced approach banks are required to compute all four drivers, whereas in the 
foundation approach they are only required to estimate the PD and rely on supervisory estimates 
for the others. These parameters are then plugged into a formula that gives the capital 
requirement corresponding to each exposure. 
The Basel II formula is derived from the requirement that capital must cover losses in a 
particular credit risk model with a confidence level of 99.9% [see Gordy (2003), for details). For 
example, in the case of corporate exposures the capital requirement k per unit of exposure is: 
 
1 1( )  (0.999) 1 ( 2.5) 1.06
1 1.51




                       (B1)
 
 















 20.11852 0.05478 ln( )b PD  
   (B3) 
Thus the capital requirement is the LGD multiplied by three terms. The first one, within 
square brackets, is the 99.9% percentile of the distribution of the losses of a large portfolio of 
loans with a probability of default PD minus the expected losses (that are supposed to be 
covered with loan loss provisions). The second term is a maturity adjustment that is increasing in 
the maturity M of the loan, and equal to 1 for M = 1 year. The term ρ in the formula is a 
parameter intended to capture the extent of correlation in defaults in the loan portfolio. It is 
decreasing in PD, so riskier loans are supposed to be less correlated —in terms of the credit risk 
model they have higher idiosyncratic risk. The third term is a scaling factor that increases the 
capital requirement by 6%. This factor was computed using quantitative impact studies data to 
broadly maintain the aggregate level of the capital requirements. 
Figure B1 plots the relationship between the capital requirement k and the PD, 
for LGD = 45% and M = 1. The function is increasing (for the relevant range) and concave in PD, 
so increases in the probability of default translate into less than proportional increases in the 
capital requirement. 
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This figure shows the Basel II capital requirement for corporate exposures as a function of the probability of default (PD) 
assuming a loss given default (LGD) of 45%, and a maturity M = 1 year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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Appendix A: Empirical results 
Table A1. Estimation results 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the logistic model of firms’ default. The dependent variable takes value 
1 if borrower i defaults in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. COLLATERALit represents average (weighted by the size 
of exposures) of the proportion of guarantees in a firm’s borrowing. MATURITYit represents the proportion of long-term 
exposures (more than one year) over total exposures. AGEit accounts for the number of years a borrower has been reporting 
to the Credit Register. FIRM_SIZEit is the log of a firm’s borrowing deflated by the consumer price index. NUMBER_BANKSit 
is the number of banks with which a firm has lending relationships. MAIN_LENDER_CHANGEit indicates the frequency with 
which firms change the bank which provides them with the largest amount of funding. UTILIZATIONit is the ratio between the 
amount of credit drawn by a borrower and the total available amount (credit line). HISTORIC_DELINQUENCYit is the number 
of years in which a firm has been delinquent divided by the number of years it has been reporting to the Credit Register. 
HISTORIC_DEFAULTit is the number of years in which a firm has been in default divided by the number of years it has been 
reporting to the Credit Register. GDP_GROWTHt is the rate of growth of the gross domestic product, CREDIT_GROWTHt is 
the rate of growth of the commercial and industrial loans in the Credit Register, and STOCK_MARKET_RETURNt is the rate 
of change of the Spanish stock market index. 
 
*All coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Dependent variable (0/1): Borrowers’ default in t + 1 Coefficient* S.E. 
Borrower variables (t)   
    COLLATERAL 0.169 0.017 
    MATURITY -0.251 0.016 
    AGE dummy 2 0.868 0.023 
    AGE dummy 3 0.756 0.024 
    AGE dummy 4 -0.100 0.023 
    FIRM_SIZE -0.254 0.005 
    NUMBER_BANKS 0.488 0.013 
    MAIN_LENDER_CHANGE 0.660 0.029 
    UTILIZATION 2.655 0.034 
    HISTORIC_DELINQUENCY 2.133 0.024 
    HISTORIC_DEFAULT 2.858 0.058 
Macro variables (t)   
    GDP_GROWTH -0.148 0.005 
    CREDIT_GROWTH -1.596 0.087 
    STOCK_MARKET_RETURN -0.248 0.023 
Control_Variables (t)   
    Regional_dummies Yes  
    Industry_dummies Yes  
Constant -4.829 0.046 
   
Number of observations 996,885  
Sample period (annual) 1987-2008  
Pseudo R2 10.28%  
Log pseudolikelihood 
 
        -
145,548.960  
LR chi2(47) 33,349.380  
Prob > chi2 0.000  
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Table A2. Model performance 
 
Notes: This table reports the performance of the estimated logit model for an in-sample (a random 10% of the population) 
and an out-of-sample set of observations (another random 10% of the population) in terms of observed and predicted 
defaults, areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, and Accuracy Ratios (AR).33  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
                                                                          
33. The AR measure determines the performance enhancement over the random model. For references 
on these performance statistics see, for example, Sobehart, Keenan and Stein (2000), Sobehart and Keenan 
(2001), and Engelmann, Hayden and Tasche (2003).  
 
Classification Classification Table Classification Table 
Power In-sample model Out-of-sample model 
     
 Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted 
 Defaults Non-Defaults Defaults Non-Defaults 
Observed defaults 68.01% 30.27% 68.05% 29.54% 
  
Observed non-
defaults 31.99% 69.73% 31.95% 70.46% 
     
 
Area under ROC curve = 
0.76 Area under ROC curve = 0.76 
 Accuracy ratio = 52% Accuracy ratio = 52%
 




Figure 1. PIT capital requirements and GDP growth 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, together with the 
Spanish GDP growth rate.  
Source: Authors’ calculations (capital), Instituto Nacional Estadística, INE, (GDP growth). 
 
 
Figure 2. PIT capital requirements and HP trend 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, together with the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend.  























Capital PIT HP Trend
i l I  (left axis) GDP (right axis) 
it l I    r  
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Figure 3. PIT and TTC capital requirements and HP trend 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) and through-the-cycle (TTC) Basel II 
capital requirements per unit of loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of 
Spanish banks, together with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the PIT series.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4. PIT capital requirements, GDP adjustment, and HP trend 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, the adjustment using 
a multiplier based on GDP growth, and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the PIT series.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Capital PIT HP Trend Capital TTC 
Capital PIT HP Trend GDP Adjustment 
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Figure 5. PIT capital requirements, credit adjustment, and HP trend 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, the adjustment using 
a multiplier based on credit growth, and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the PIT series.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 6. PIT capital requirements, stock market adjustment, and HP trend 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, the adjustment using 
a multiplier based on the return of the Spanish stock market, and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
trend of the PIT series.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Capital PIT 
Capital PIT HP Trend 
HP Trend Stock Market Adjustment 
Credit Adjustment 
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Figure 7. PIT capital requirements, autoregressive adjustment, and HP trend 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, the autoregressive 
adjustment, and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the PIT series.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 8. Weighted average PDs and cyclically-varying LGDs 
Notes: This figure shows the average (weighted by the size of the exposures) probability of 
default (PD) for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks, and the 
cyclically-varying loss given default (LGD) computed by assuming that it is increasing in PD 
according to equation (5).  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Capital PIT HP Trend Autoregressive 
Weighted PD (left axis) LGDs (right axis) 
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Figure 9. PIT capital requirements with and without variable LGDs 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks using a 45% loss 
given default (LGD) and a cyclically-varying LGD.  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 10. PIT expected and unexpected losses 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate point-in-time (PIT) Basel II capital requirements per unit of 
loans for the portfolio of commercial and industrial loans of Spanish banks using a 45% loss 
given default (LGD), and the corresponding expected losses per unit of loans computed by 
multiplying the LGD by the average (weighted by the size of the exposures) probability of default 
(PD).  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Capital PIT (45% LGD) Capital PIT (LGD%=f(PD)) 
Unexpected Losses Expected Losses 
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